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SYMPOSIUM PAPER
TIE TRAFFIC IN SOULS: PRIVACY INTERESTS
AND THE INTELLIGENT VEHICLE-
HIGHWAY SYSTEMS
Sheldon W. Halpernt
IVHS can improve safety, reduce congestion, enhance mobility,
minimize environmental impact, save energy, and promote eco-
nomic productivity in our transportation system. It will multiply the
effectiveness of future spending on highway construction and main-
tenance and will increase the attractiveness of public transportation.
IVHS will be as basic a transportation raw material as concrete,
asphalt, or steel rail.1
[S]cientific and technological advances have raised the spectre
of new and frightening invasions of privacy. Our capacity as a soci-
ety to deal with the impact of this new technology depends, in part,
on the degree to which we can assimilate the threat it poses to the
settled ways our legal institutions have developed for dealing with.
similar threats in the past.2
I. IMODUCTION
The development of The Intelligent Vehicle-Highway System
(IVHS) is serious business. Notwithstanding visions of high-tech cir-
cuitry producing a low comedy circus, there is a real and expensive
long-term commitment to the refinement and implementation of
IVHS. "Over the next 20 years, a national IVHS program could have a
greater societal impact than even the Interstate Highway System."3
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1. IVHS ARcHnr uRE DE. PRorRAm, IwsarM STATUS REPoRT 2 (April, 1994) [here-
inafter 1VHS ARcHrEcruRE].
2. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. R-v. 962, 963 (1964) (footnote omitted).
3. IVHS Aaca recrunp, supra note 1, at 2.
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From significant federal funding4 to the creation of a voluminous Stra-
tegic Plan by IVHS America, a consortium of private industry,
academia and other institutions seeking to define and, by so doing
structure and direct, the nature and content of IVHS,5 one can see that
the stakes are high and the players powerful. In short, there is much
more than smoke, mirrors and a cosmetic political attempt to capital-
ize on an infatuation with technology.6
Conceptually, IVHS has significant potential, even if so far the
laboring financial oar has been borne by the government; private sec-
tor hard commitment remains elusive and well short of what had been
contemplated.7 The technology contemplates a structure in which
"roadways, vehicles, and travelers are integrated into a single in-
4. See Joseph Sussman and Hans Klein, What the IVHS Strategic Planning Process
Taught the Planners, IVHS R-v. 9, 19 (1993). "In 1991 Congress authorized $660 million of
federal funds for IVHS activities over the following six years. A second piece of legislation
authorized an additional $170 million for 1992 and 1993." By 1993 President Clinton proposed
increasing this authorization to $925 million from fiscal year 1994 through 1997. Kristine M.
Williams, IVHS: Smart Cars, Smart Highways, ALI-ABA COURSE OF Srm~y, LAND Usa INsTi.
TuraE: PLANNING, REGtn.ArIoN, LmoGAoN, EmNENT DoMAIN, AmD COMPENSArON, C851 ALI-
ABA 627, 683 (1993). Ms. Williams suggests that
Federal support for IVHS appears to have evolved in part from the desire to redi-
rect defense industries in the post-military industrial complex toward domestic
projects. IVHS spending aims to focus high tech innovations on improving the
efficiency and safety of the surface transportation system. By providing the op-
portunity for new contracts to corporations previously receiving defense dollars,
IVHS also promises to preserve jobs and help rebuild the nation's sagging
economy.
Id.
5. IVHS AMERICA, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR INTEWGEN VEHICLE-HIGHWAY SYsTEms IN
THE UNrrED STATES, Report No. IVHS-America-92-3 (1992) [hereinafter STRATEGIC PLA]. See
also IVHS ARCHrrEcTuRE, supra note 1.
IVHS AMERICA is a public/private partnership encompassing all levels of gov-
ernment, the private sector, professional associations, and the universities, in a
joint effort to define and advance a national IVHS program for more efficient,
safer, and environmentally sound road transport through research, development,
testing, and implementation of advanced technology. IVHS AMERICA's role is
to define IVHS goals for North America, facilitate IVHS coordination across ju-
risdictional and sector boundaries, identify and oversee the development of rele-
vant standards, and provide reliable information on IVHS to the general public.
Primer on Intelligent Vehicle Highway Systems, TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH CIRCuLAR 8 (Aug.,
1993) (hereinafter Primer).
6. See, e.g., IVHS ARcarruuM, supra note 1, at 2:
IVHS is not a distant vision. Already, real systems, products, and services are
being tested throughout the U.S. Some first-generation systems are on the market
or in the final stages of development. More than 20 real-world operational tests
are now under way or are planned as federal/state/private ventures to evaluate
more advanced IVHS concepts and components.
7. "The national program seems to be unfolding as a public sector development program
.... Evidence for fulfillment of the prediction of overwhelming private sector investment in
1VHS (80 percent of the total) is not yet apparent." Sussman and Klein, supra note 4.
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termodal system."' The presently contemplated modules to be inte-
grated include Advanced Traffic Management Systems, Advanced
Traveler Information Systems, Advanced Vehicle Control Systems,
Commercial Vehicle Operations, Advanced Public Transportation
Systems and Advanced Rural Transportation Systems. 9 Field testing
of components of the system is well underway. 10 When and if the
parts become fully integrated and operational, there will be in place,
on the one hand, an integrated highway directional, safety and control
system and, on the other, a technology by which vehicles-presuma-
bly with occupants-may be tagged and tracked and the information
generated by that tracking stored, manipulated, and used. Hence the
concern over privacy," a concern with significant political and finan-
cial implications for the entire project.
In its Strategic Plan, IVHS AMERICA acknowledges that pri-
vacy protection must be considered "to assure program integrity and
credibility and to secure public acceptance and support." 2 At the
same time, the Plan cautions that privacy "[1]imitatioris and protec-
tions on the use of data collected in IVHS that might help in the fi-
nance of programs could ... limit opportunities for its beneficial use,
both for public sector planning and for commercialization."' 3
8. Id. at 17.
9. Id. at 11.
10. See Primer, supra note 5 at 13-16; see also IVHS ARcHrmrcruRE, supra note 1, at 3.
11. See, e.g., the STRATmric PLAN, supra note 5, at MI-128:
Appropriate safeguards and guidelines on the control and use of IVHS informa-
tion must ... be built into the process in order to alleviate concerns over the
inappropriate use of the data and in order to protect the privacy of individual
vehicle users.
As Miller observed more than twenty years ago:
Close scrutiny and evaluation of the implications of information technology on
individual privacy are especially appropriate... because of the rising interest in
many quarters for the establishment of governmental and private data centers. The
extent to which federal agencies and private companies are using computers ... to
collect, store, and exchange information about the activities of private citizens is
rapidly increasing.
Arthur B. Miller, Computers, Data Banks and Individual Privacy: An Overview, 4 COLuM.
HuMAN RicSs L. Rnv. 1, 3 (1972). See George B. Trubow, Protecting Informational Privacy in
the Information Society, 10 N. ILL. U.L. Rv. 521, 527(1990) ("It is clear that new information
and communication technologies pose serious threats to informational privacy in both the public
and private sectors").
12. SRA'Fic PLAN, supra note 5, at 111-128. See also IVHS ARcmmcruRE, supra note
1, at 22.
13. STRAToic PLAN, supra note 5, at m-129.
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II. Tm PRIVACY PROBLEM
The very phrase "Intelligent Vehicle-Highway Systems" po-
larizes. As an immediate example of computer controlled observation,
data collection and activity direction, it evokes the duality that seems
to attend the interface between high technology and human activity. 4
One is instinctively drawn either to utter a reverential paean to the
gods of technology who will make our automobile-driven lives richer,
safer and more accurate, if not more scenic, or to mutter luddite im-
precations spiced salaciously with reference to a not-so-benign "big
brother". Here we are presented with the prospect of a vast (read per-
vasive and intrusive) network (read spider web) of nurture and gui-
dance (suspicion and surveillance) that will ensure bur safety and
security (subservience and conformity) by means of unobtrusive (se-
cret) technological systems. One anticipates the millennium with
either wonder and awe or dread and foreboding-we eagerly await or
we view with alarm. Discussion and the formulation of policy will all
too often be predicated on one or the other of these underlying
mindsets.
When considering the privacy implications of technological
change we tend to focus on the dramatic. The celebrity-hero pursued
by the police tracked through triangulation of cellular telephone sig-
nals originating from the car in which he is a passenger' 5 captures a
huge television audience that watches the balletic pursuit from the
vantage point of a hovering helicopter. The immediacy and intimacy
are inescapable as is the sense of dislocation of reality.' 6 The fascina-
tion with watching-witnessing the private-ranges, of course, from
the mundane act of secretly investigating the contents of a friend's
bathroom medicine cabinet to the much less benign act of stalking.
14. See Philip E. Agre, Surveillance and Capture: Two Models of Privacy, 10 Tim INoR.
MATIoN Socmny 101 (1994):
As Kling and Dunlop (1993) have pointed out, analysis of the place of computer
technology in society has often been impoverished through a bifurcation into two
structurally opposed genres, which they call utopian and anti-utopian. The utopian
genre, as its name suggests, emphasizes good things: efficiency, the amplification
of various professions' powers, and other beneficial consequences of computing.
The anti-utopian genre, for its part, draws on a stock of cultural images of class
conflict and totalitarian domination. Both genres are prevalent in journalistic and
academic writing alike.
Id. at 115.
15. Simpson, Under Suicide Watch, is Jailed After a Bizarre Chase, N.Y. TjmEs, June 19,
1994, at 1, col. 2 (Nat'l Ed.).
16. Because we are watching we become part of the scene, an audience that increasingly
may be unable to distinguish reality from "entertainment." The act of watching, of making the
private act a public one may itself transform both the watchers and the watched.
[Vol. 11
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Thus, it is not at all surprising that the association that springs
from the idea of a system that facilitates the identification, locating
and tracking of a passenger vehicle, is that of watching. In short, as
noted by Philip Agre,17 the model of privacy that first suggests itself
in this context is that of sur'veillance-the flying goose has been
tagged and can no longer hide or freely fly.
The "surveillance model," currently dominant in the public dis-
course of at least the English-speaking world, is built upon visual
metaphors and derives from historical experiences of secret police
surveillance. [The surveillance model originates in the classically
political sphere of state action.. *18
To be sure, the matter, of surveillance should not be trivialized. 19
There is reason to be concerned about systems that could facilitate
state control by means of tagging devices that locate and track individ-
uals. The fact that a vehicle, rather than its occupant, is the tagged and
tracked object is, as a matter of reality, irrelevant. For most purposes,
17. Agre, supra note 14.
18. Id at 101, 107. Agre defines the model further
The surveillance model has five components:
(1) visual metaphors, as in Orwell's "Big Brother is watching you" or Bentham's
Panopticon;
(2) the assumption that this "watching" is nondisruptive and surreptitious (except
perhaps when going astray or issuing a threat);
(3) territorial metaphors, as in the "invasion" of a "private" personal space,
prototypically the family home, marked out by "rights" and the opposition be-
tween "coercion" and "consent";
(4) centralized orchestration by means of a bureaucracy with a unified set of
"files"; and
(5) identification with the state, and in particular, with consciously planned-out
malevolent aims of a specifically political nature.
When stated in this way, it becomes evident that the surveillance model is a cul-
tural phenomenon. Although its earliest genealogy deserves further research, its
modem history is clearly rooted in the historical experience of secret police orga-
nizations and their networks of listening devices and informers, most prominently
in the totalitarian states of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, and to a lesser but
still significant extent in the United States. George Orwell's 1984 gave these sym-
bols their most vivid literary form, but the cultural legacy of this history is also
evident in, for example, the unpleasant connotations associated with certain uses
of a word like "files".
Id. at 105-106.
19. Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. Rnv. 707,
726-29 (1987). "[B]ecause of both the broad availability of personal data and the elaborate
matching procedures, individual activities can be accurately reconstructed through automated
processing. Surveillance becomes the order of the day." Id. at 726.
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tracking my car is tracking me.20 So too, the law has recognized the
actionability of certain kinds of "overzealous" surveillance.1
Concomitant with tracking is compilation of personal informa-
tion.. With surveillance comes the "dossier". The modem dossier, the
product of sophisticated computer compilation and manipulation of
data cannot escape its sinister connotations and images of an omni-
present and information-stuffed controlling presence.22 Finally, the
existence of the watchers and the dossier combine to alter individual
behavior to accommodate and conform to the system. 3 The frighten-
ing 1984 scenario, again, should not simply be dismissed as a form of
anti-technology paranoia. Society must be alert to the threat of cen-
tralized accumulated governmental power which may be directed at
designated individuals.24 However, while the twentieth century has
20. See Agre, supra note 14 at 104:
One might further distinguish between systems that track human beings and sys-
tems that track physical objects. Such a distinction would be misleading, though.
Systems are indeed found at each extreme-for example radio transmitters at-
tached to shipping crates or fastened to prisoners' limbs, But many of the systems
track both people and objects, and others track objects as stand-ins for people.
21. See Nader v. General Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 771 (1970).
22. See, e.g., Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of Personal
Information, 65 TEx. L. Ray. 1395-96 (1987):
Large databases, when combined with sophisticated programming techniques, en-
able companies to discover an individual's attitudes, values, interests, and opin-
ions. The same technology that fills mailboxes with advertisements for countless
products can facilitate the creation of thorough dossiers documenting a person's
private activities.
Because computer technology so dramatically facilitates collecting, storing,
processing, and disseminating information, it poses a number of new threats to
individual privacy.
23. Id. at 1396:
Knowing that every transaction is forever stored in an electronic database can
change an individual's perception of herself and her relationship to society. She
knows she can never discard her past, that others will judge her on a computer
record. Thus she is apt to assume conformist behavior to maintain a "good" rec-
ord, avoid "deviant" or controversial activity regardless of her true beliefs and
feelings, and reduce her independent action and thought. The concomitant loss of
individual diversity saps social vitality. The changes wrought by the use of com-
puters also may have large-scale effects. Power may shift to large bureaucratic
institutions with the resources to make full use of the new technology, denying
individuals the opportunity to participate in society's most basic transactions.
(footnote omitted)
See Simitis, supra note 19, at 710 ("personal information is increasingly used to enforce stan-
dards of behavior. Information processing is developing, therefore, into an essential element of
long-term strategies of manipulation intended to mold and adjust individual conduct").
24. Cf Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information Society
(1977):
... Americans must... be concerned about the long term effect record-
keeping practices can have not only on relationships between individuals and or-
ganizations, but also on the balance of power between government and the rest of
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witnessed such centralized and totalitarian state activity, the complex-
ity of American society indicates that this response to technology is at
once overly dramatic in its focus on malicious state action5 and sim-
plistic in ignoring the more banal but insidious impact that tracking
technology may have on the individual. The IVHS complex, along
with cognate systems, implicates a more sophisticated and mul-
tivariate set of privacy concerns. With its assumption of significant, if
not dominant private industry participation and control, IVHS is not
the state centered leviathan spawning a single and sinister "Big
Brother". Concomitantly, the lack of a single federal "villain" pre-
cludes a single, federal legislative solution.26
IVHS contemplates a comprehensive tracking and information
compilation system that inevitably raises concerns for the individual
"tracked".27 The various modules of the systems involve or would fa-
the society. Accumulations of information about individuals tend to enhance au-
thority by making it easier for authority to reach individuals directly. Thus,
growth in society's record-keeping capability poses the risk that existing poser
balances will be upset.
Id. at 6.
25. See Agre, supra note 14, at 116:
When applied as the sole framework of computing and privacy, the surveillance
model contributes to the near-inevitability of oversimplified analysis.... Unfortu-
nately, all the surveillance model offers is a metaphor of bureaucratically organ-
ized state terror that often seems disproportionate to the actual experience of
corporate life. The rhetoric of "Big Brother technologies" is easily-and fre-
quently- ridiculed through paraphrase in terms of "sinister conspiracies" and the
like. The paradoxical result is that genuinely worrisome developments can seem
"not so bad" simply for lacking the overt horrors of Orwell's dystopia.
26. See Simitis, supra note 19, at 726:
[Tihe aim of controlling and adjusting individual behavior is by no means an
exclusive attribute of processing activities initiated by the state. [P]rivate enter-
prises and state agencies resort to automated processing for quite similar pur-
poses.... The boundaries between the public and private sectors are thus blurred.
Personal data, once stored, tend to become a flexible, common base of
information.
27. Agre describes tracking systems:
In each case, some entity changes state, a 'computer internally represents those
states, and certain technical and social means are provided for (intendedly at least)
maintaining the correspondence between the representation and the reality. The
computer may maintain a centralized database (this is the usual case) or it may be
more widely distributed. Each entity has a definite identity that remains stable
over time, and if several entities are being tracked then the tracking system has
some means of consistently "attaching" a given entity to its corresponding repre-
sentation. This representation will be expressed within some mathematically de-
finable representation scheme, which is capable of expressing a certain formal
space of states of affairs. The computer maintains a representation only of certain
aspects of the entity. In particular, the representation scheme recognizes certain
specific kinds of changes-of-state, namely those which correspond to changes in
the stored representation. . ... As the entity's corresponding representation
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cilitate tracking and the accumulation of information. Advanced
Traveler Information Systems, in providing on-board display, gui-
dance, and warning systems provides the basis for individual automo-
bile tracking. Advanced Vehicle Control Systems directly intrudes
into the driver's control over the vehicle. Commercial Vehicle Opera-
tions, while targeted to commercial vehicles nevertheless put in place
direct tagging and monitoring technology through the Automatic
Vehicle Identification, Automatic Vehicle Classification, Automatic
Vehicle Location, and other sub-systems. Advanced Rural Transporta-
tion Systems similarly include Automatic Vehicle Location and route
guidance components. Advanced Traffic Management and Advanced
Public Transportation Systems, although not keyed to individuals, call
for the development of easily expandable control and tracking
systems. 28
Rather than individual surveillance, the tracking technology here
is designed to provide behavioral information that in its origin is indif-
ferent to the individual to whom the information relates. In so doing,
however, detailed information about the individual activity is captured
and stored, in a process that necessarily impacts upon the individual.
29
As the United States Supreme Court has observed, "the power of com-
pilations to affect personal privacy... outstrips the combined power
of the bits of information contained within."3 IVHS ultimately in-
volves a system of electronic "watchers" observing and recording in-
dividual-specific information which may then be used for a variety of
purposes; purposes which, however benign in intent, arise out of indi-
vidual exposure to the system, in a process that offers an opportunity
for exploitation and abuse.
changes, records may well be kept of its state transitions, yielding a "history" of
its trajectory through time. And this trajectory, of course, can be either literal or
metaphorical, depending on what aspects of the entity are represented.
Tracking systems like these can obviously be used for good or ill.
Agre, supra note 14 at 104-105.
28. Primer, supra note 5, at 5-7.
29. See Agre, supra note 14 at 105:
[T]racking schemes have another side: the practical arrangements through which
the data is collected in the first place, includfng the arrangements that make
human activities and physical processes trackable. As human activities become
intertwined with the mechanisms of computerized tracking, the notion of human
interactions with a "computer"- understood as a discrete, physically localized
entity-begins to lose its force; in its place we encounter activity-systems that are
thoroughly integrated with distributed computational processes.
30. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 765 (1989).
[Vol. I11
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Abuse, in its most sinister form-state surveillance and con-
trol-is the most glaring, if not the most likely horror scenario. The
exploitative, commercial use of individual data for purposes unrelated
to the rationale of IVHS is a more insidious and more likely concomi-
tant of the tracking/collection process." Beyond these blatant privacy
concerns we must consider the impact of the very existence of a
highly integrated watching system devoted to what has become for
many a core factor in daily living-automobile travel. With or without
the possibility of the creation of individually referable data bases, in a
variant of the Heisenberg Principle, the fact alone of being observed
may modify and control the behavior of the subject of the observation.
So too, there is discomfort with a series of interlocked systems capa-
ble of accumulating and coordinating data arising from individual
tracking. Ultimately, concern exists over the use of retained data,
whether by creating product oriented mailing lists targeted to specific
driver "profiles" or more personal uses of the detailed behavioral in-
formation. On a more general level, "[flora democratic society ... the
risks are high: labeling of individuals, manipulative tendencies, mag-
nification of errors, and strengthening of social control threaten the
very fabric of democracy."32
In any case, it is the consequence of continuing mass capture33
and storage of data in the IVHS that drives the privacy inquiry. That
31. Cf Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier
for Individual Rights? 44 FED. Comm. LJ. 195, 207 (1992) ("In fact, Americans today are more
distrustful of industry than government with respect to the collection and use of personal infor-
mation") (footnote omitted).
Data-gathering and dossier-building are as prevalent in private industry as in
government. Personal information can be used for commercial purposes, such as
generating a list of prospective consumers....
The commercial usi of cybernetics may go beyond this relatively benign
method of soliciting business. The line between using the technology to commu-
nicate with a customer and employing it to manipulate his attitudes is nebulous
and is likely to be transgressed frequently.
Miller, supra note 11, at 6-7.
32. Simitis, supra note 19, at 746.
33. Thus Agre postulates the "capture model" of privacy:
The term has two uses. The first and most frequent refers to a computer system's
(figurative) act of acquiring certain data as input, whether from a human operator
or from an electronic or electromechanical devie .... The second use of "cap-
ture", which is more common in artificial intelligence research, refers to a repre-
sentation scheme's ability to fully, accurately, or "cleanly" express particular
semantic notions or distinctions, without reference to the actual taking-in of
data....
The capture model can be contrasted point-by-point with the surveillance model.
It comprises:
(1) linguistic metaphbrs for human-activities, assimilating them to the constructs
of a computer system's representation languages;
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inquiry must consider whether the individual about whom data is cap-
tured has or should have any rights with respect to (a) the capture
process itself-whether, when and how the capture is to occur; (b) the
storage process-how' where, and for how long should such data be
kept and who is to have access to it; and (c) the dissemination pro-
cess-for what purposes and how is the data to be used. 4 The issue of
use is perhaps the most troubling,35 although each aspect of the track-
ing/capture complex has implications for individual behavior and
rights. Indeed, control over or limitations upon the storage process
may well obviate the problems of use. 6 Overall is the question of
whether and to what extent an individual has a proprietary interest in
personal data. Who, if anyone, "owns" me or, if not me, detailed data
about me? The task of the legal system is to find or create appropriate
models-privacy or property paradigms-to define individual rights
and technological limitations in order both to derive the benefits of the
technology and to preserve the societal values that underlie the right of
privacy.
It is suggested here that the privacy and property legal complex,
as it presently exists, cannot adequately provide the necessary model
with universal application and that reconciliation of IVHS and privacy
interests can be achieved primarily through ad hoc adjustment in the
system itself. The very technology that gives rise to the problem can
be the means for limiting, if not obviating the possibility of privacy
abuses arising out of that technology.
(2) the assumption that the linguistic "parsing" of human activities involves ac-
tive intervention in and reorganization of those activities;
(3) structural metaphors; the captured activity is figuratively assembled from a
"catalog" of parts provided as part of its institutional setting;
(4) decentralized and heterogeneous organization; the process is normally con-
ducted within particular, local practices which involve people in the workings of
larger social formations; and
(5) the driving aims are not political but philosophical, as activity is reconstructed
through assimilation to a transcendent ("virtual") order of mathematical
formalism.
Agre, supra note 14, at 106-107.
34. See Reidenberg, supra note 31.
35. As Reidenberg notes:
A 1990 poll taken in the United States by Equifax, one of the major national
credit reporting agencies, found that seventy-nine percent of Americans are con-
cerned about privacy and the use of personal information [and] seventy-one per-
cent of Americans believe they have lost control over the use and dissemination
of personal information.
Id. at 198 (citing Louis HAmRs Assocs. & A.N F. WEnSr, EQuiFAX, INc., THE EQu Wx
REPORT ON CoNsuMsRS IN THE INFORMATON AGF, at V (1990) (footnotes omitted).
36. See infra notes 117-126 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 11
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III. PARADIGm LOST: THE RIGHT oF PRIVACY AND COLLE CrON
AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
The American legal system does not contain a comprehensive set
of privacy fights or principles that collectively address the acquisition,
storage, transmission, use and disclosure of personal information
within the business community.... Instead, legal protection is ac-
corded exclusively through privacy rights created on an ad hoc basis
by federal or state legislation or state common law rules.37
A. The Nature of the "Classic" Privacy Tort
"Privacy" is an elusive concept, connoting an array of values,
thoughts, aspirations, and fears defying 'objective unification:
The word "privacy" has taken on so many different meanings
and connotations in so many different legal and social contexts that
it has largely ceased to convey any single coherent concept....
Most people will readily agree that they should have a "right of
privacy." But when pressed for a definition, they will give widely
varying responses....
It is apparent that the word "privacy" has proven to be a pow-
erful rhetorical battle cry in a plethora of unrelated contexts....
Like the emotive word "freedom", "privacy" means so many differ-
ent things to so many different people that it has lost any precise
legal connotation that it might once have had.38
This paper is concerned with the "privacy" tort, embracing an
individual's claim against another who, in exercising an otherwise
lawful right, impinges upon that individual's interest in anonymity. As
such, the tort must be distinguished from a purported constitutional
"right of privacy," which refers to an individual's rights against intru-
sive governmental action, "the claim that each citizen has a right of
autonomy-a right to decide how to live and to associate with others,
free from all but the most carefully limited impingements by govern-
mental authority."39
37. Reidenberg, supra note 31, at 208 (footnotes omitted).
38. J.THo.s McCARnay, THE RiGHrs OF PuBLicrrY AND PRIvAcY § 1.1[B][11, at 1-3;
§ 5.7[D], at 5-65 (1992). "The phrase 'a right of privacy' as used in law has almost as many
meanings as Hydra had heads." Diane L. Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The
Light That Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 364 (1989).
39. Zimmerman, supra note 38, at 364. Professor McCarthy suggests that "the only signif-
icant thing that the Constitutional right of privacy and the common law right of privacy share is
the label." McCARmY, supra note 38, at 5-60-61; but cf. Richard C. Turkington, The Emerging
Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 479 (1990),
which elaborates upon a linkage between the tort and constitutional privacy rights.
56 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11
It has become axiomatic to note that the modem privacy tort be-
gan when Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis postulated a com-
mon law "right to privacy."4 As I have suggested elsewhere,41
whether such a common-law right, with a concomitant tort remedy,
actually existed42 or was created by the authors,4 3 is now more of
historical"4 than practical interest, as virtually all jurisdictions now
recognize, either by common law or statute, some form of the individ-
ual's right to exercise some degree of control over the public use of
his or her persona.45
The development of the tort has been marked by confusion and
controversy over the nature of the right, exemplified by the diverse
analytic models of Dean William Prosser and Dr. Edward Bloustein.
Dean Prosser postulated a right of privacy embracing "not one tort,
but a complex of four different interests. '46 Bloustein argued that
Prosser had both misstated and diminished the right of privacy,47 and
sought to bring Prosser's divergent, separate "torts" within a unifying
conceptual umbrella, shielding a single interest, "the interest in pre-
serving individual dignity. 48
40. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193
(1890).
41. Sheldon W. Halpern, Rethinking the Right of Privacy: Dignity, Decency, and the Law's
Limitations, 43 RuTGERs L. REv. 539 (1991).
42. Compare Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447 (N.Y. 1902) with
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80-81 (Ga. 1905).
43. See Peter Felcher & Edward Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real Peo-
ple by the Media, 88 YAmE L. 1577, 1581 (1979) (suggesting that Warren and Brandeis, "in the
process of searching for [a common law right of privacy] succeeded in inventing it"); Zimmer-
man, supra, note 38, at 364-65 (1989) ("The common law right of privacy was conceived in the
late nineteenth century by the fertile intellects of Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, and was
born on the pages of the Harvard Law Review.")
44. See MCCARTHY, supra note 38, at § 1.3; Jerome A. Barron, Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rev. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SuFFOLK
U.L. R v. 875 (1979); Dorothy Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARiZ. L. REv.
1 (1979).
45. See Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 82 (W. Va. 1984). See also
McC~ARTY, supra note 38, ch. 6.
46. William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALF. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960). Dean Prosser defined
these separate torts as "(1) Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude .... (2) Public
disclosure of embarrassing private facts .... (3) Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false
light .... (4) Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness."
Id. This theory of distinctive branches off a common privacy root was codified in the REsTATE.
imrE (SEcowb) oF ToRTs § 652A (1976) (a section for which Dean Prosser had been the
Reporter).
47. Bloustein, supra note 2, at 965-66, 970.
48. Id. at 986. Bloustein concluded that "the interest protected in each [of Prosser's distinct
'torts'] is the same, it is human dignity and individuality or, in Warren and Brandeis' words,
'inviolate personality.' "Id. at 991. See also SmLowN W. HAL.PRN, m LAw oF DEFAmATON,
PRIVACY, PuBntcrry AND MoRAL. RIGHT 376 (2d ed. 1993) ("Notwithstanding its appearance in
opinions, almost as an obligatory prelude to discussion of 'privacy,' there is serious doubt as to
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[T]he interest served in the privacy cases is in some sense a spiri-
tual interest rather than an interest in property or reputation ....
[T]he spiritual characteristic which is at issue is not a form of
trauma, mental illness or distress, but rather individuality or
freedom.
An intrusion on our privacy threatens our liberty as individuals
to do as we will, just as an assault, a battery or imprisonment of our
person does.... [We should] regard privacy as a dignitary tort....
The injury is to our individuality, to our dignity as individuals, and
the legal remedy represents a social vindication of the human spirit
thus threatened rather than a recompense for the loss suffered.49
More recently, Professor Robert Post has suggested that the
strong moral basis for a right of privacy inheres in our system of com-
munity and the respect accorded the individual by the community.
50
To Professor Post, "the common law tort of invasion of privacy offers
a rich and complex apprehension of the texture of social life in
America."51 His formulation in terms of rules of "civility" extrapo-
lates individual dignity into a complex community norm. 2 It impli-
cates the very fabric of a civilized society:
[The plain fact [is] that privacy is for us a living reality only be-
cause we enjoy a certain kind of communal existence. Our very
"dignity" inheres in that existence, which, if it is not acknowledged
and preserved, will vanish, as will the privacy we cherish.
53
Both Post and Bloustein sought to give legal structure to what
they saw as a deeply moral construct. A violation of privacy is a viola-
tion of the self, when, as Bloustein compassionately recognized, "[t]he
innermost region of being-the soul, if you will-has been bruised by
exposure to the world."54
The privacy right underlying the tort has been understood to re-
late to the bruises to the soul that follow from unwanted public expo-
sure. Classically, it has concerned the unconsented to public use of
the utility and validity of the Prosser quadrupedal analysis, particularly when one considers the
interests underlying the different causes of action").
49. Bloustein, supra note 2, at 1002-03 (footnote omitted).
50. Robert Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common
Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REv. 957 (1989). Professor Post builds on the work of Erving Goffman.
Erving Goffnan, The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, in INTERACTION RrruAL: ESSAYS ON
FAcE-To-FAcE BEHAVIOR 47 (1967).
51. Post, supra note 50, at 959.
52. Id. at 968.
53. Id. at 1010; see also Turkington, supra note 39, at 485-87.
54. Edward J. Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice
and the Philosopher, 28 RuTGERs L. REV. 41, 54 (1974).
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another's "name or likeness."55 The tort is, in essence, a mass commu-
nication tort and the interest it protects is the interest in anonymity in
terms of public exposure.5 6 The personal, emotional, subjective nature
of the privacy interest-its relation to the injury to feelings from vio-
lated anonymity-has been regularly reaffirmed.57 The significant dif-
ficulty in building an appropriate legal construct to protect this
subjective interest has centered around the fact that the harmful public
exposure is usually the product of public truthful speech-in short, a
conflict between two values, both conflicting and necessary to a free
society. 8
The tension between the competing values has frequently been
framed in constitutional terms: how does one regulate or limit truthful
speech consistently with First Amendment protection of speech and
press. In the context of violation of privacy as a media tort, reconcilia-
tion, such as it is, of the conflict has revolved around the elusive con-
cept of "newsworthiness" in connection with mass publication of an
individual's name or likeness, either as such or as part of the publica-
tion of factual, albeit offensive or embarrassing information about the
individual named or depicted.59 From its inception, the right of pri-
55. See HAU'ERN, supra note 48, at 392. The statutory formula in New York, and several
other states, "name, portrait, or picture" (N.Y. Crv. Rioars LAW § 50 (MeKinney 1992)), is not
essentially different from the common-law "name or likeness" requirement; see also
CAL.CV.CoDE § 2233(a) (Deering Supp. 1993) (making actionable the use of someone's voice
or signature, as well as name or likeness).
56. See generally, McCAR'mY, supra note 38; HALPEmR, supra note 48, Part Two-Pri-
vacy; Trubow, supra note 11 at 534 ("the tort focuses on publication").
57. See, e.g., Fairfield ,. American Photocopy Equipment Co., 291 P.2d 194, 197 (Ca.
1955) ("The gist of the cause of action in a privacy case is ... a direct wrong of a personal
character resulting in injury to the feelings .... The injury is mental and subjective."); Crump v.
Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 85 (W. Va. 1984) ("The right has primarily served to
prevent.., emotional harm").
58. See generally, Halpern, supra note 41. "In a media saturated world contemplating a
future in which 'everyone will be world-famous for fifteen minutes,' the question becomes not
whether a bruised soul is important but whether we can afford, and practically provide to it, the
legal balm the bruise requires:' Id. at 549 (quoting Andy Warhol in J. B~ma'r, FAMIUAR
QuoTA'oNs 908 (15th ed. 1980). Cf. Simitis, supra note 19:
Because the existence of a democratic society depends essentially on an
uninhibited proliferation of information, privacy very quickly became one of the
main objects of debate. In fact, free speech has been seen, to a substantial extent,
as a product of the constant adjustment of the boundary between the individual's
right to be let alone and the public's need to be informed. The standard remarks
on the relative nature of privacy or on the necessity of a careful balancing of
interests are more than significant. Far from being considered a constitutive ele-
ment of a democratic society, privacy appears as a tolerated contradiction, the
implications of which must be continuously reconsidered.
Id. at 731-32 (footnote omitted).
59. Thus, the Restatement of Torts excludes from a privacy claim, matters "of legitimate
concern to the public." REsTATeMAENT (SEcoND) op ToRgs § 652D (1977).
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vacy was so limited.' Professor Post suggests "a normative theory of
public accountability, on the notion that the public should be entitled
to inquire freely into the significance of public persons and events,
and that this entitlement is so powerful that it overrides individual
claims to the maintenance of information preserves."' 1
In any event, the United States Supreme Court, in Cox Broad-
casting Corp. v. Cohn,62 and Florida Star v. B.J.F.,63 has made clear
the constitutional underpinning for the newsworthiness limitation on
privacy claims. 6' The Court explicitly recognized "that however it
may be ultimately defined, there is a zone of privacy surrounding
every individual," 65 and refused an invitation to "hold that truthful
publication is automatically constitutionally protected. ' 66 Neverthe-
less the Court severely limited, if it did not altogether obliterate pri-
vacy claims arising out of the publication of matter, however personal,
that is derived from some kind of public record; as Justice White, the
author of the Cox Broadcasting opinion, observed in dissent in Flor-
ida Star, "the Court accepts [an] invitation.., to obliterate one of the
most note-worthy legal inventions of the 20th Century: the tort of the
publication of private facts."'67 Certainly, the Court "seems to leave
little vitality in the tort of disclosure of private facts."
68
B. IVHS and the Privacy Tort
There is thus little room for application of the paradigmatic pri-
vacy tort to the observation, capture and use of information about indi-
viduals, as contemplated in IVHS technology. The observation,
individual "tagging" of automobiles which may readily be identified
with individuals, would not itself appear to implicate any aspect of the
privacy tort. To the limited extent that such activity-observation per
se, absent publication-has been deemed actionable, it has been sur-
60. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 40, at 214-15. ('The design of the law [of privacy]
must be to protect those persons with whose affairs the community has no legitimate concern,
from being dragged into an undesirable and undesired publicity") (emphasis in original). See also
Post; supra note 50, at 996 ("Long before the Constitution was relevant to the regulation of the
invasion of privacy tort, the common law was sensitive to just such policy concerns regarding the
diffusion of information") (footnote omitted).
61. Post, supra note 50, at 1001 (emphasis in original).
62. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
63. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
64. The Court, in each case, invalidated state privacy claims arising out of the publication
of offensive and embarrassing material.
65. Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 487 (emphasis in original).
66. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541.
67. Id. at 550 (White, J., dissenting).
68. David Anderson, Tortious Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 71, 90 (1990).
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reptitious and offensively intrusive.69 It would be difficult to extend to
an individual the right to prevent observation arising from detection
devices which the individual knows are installed in his or her car. One
should not, of course, emphasize too strongly the aspect of voluntari-
ness with respect to the installation of devices in an automobile.70
Although I may "voluntarily" purchase a car with knowledge of the
device's presence, after the full implementation of IVHS it would in
all likelihood be impossible for me to get a car without the device.
Indeed, for the systems to be truly effective in dealing with traffic
movement, safety, direction, and the general purposes to be achieved
by IVHS, participation would have to be virtually universal. Neverthe-
less, the very extent of the "surveillance," the vast size of the enter-
prise and its lack of direct individual focus would in all likelihood
preclude individual claims predicated on the intrusive nature of the
activity.
So, too, with respect to the accumulation and dissemination of
data-the creation and exploitation of an individual profile- the pri-
vacy tort paradigm seems inapplicable. As discussed above, the tort is
at its heart founded on mass publication; the subjective, emotional in-
terest involved arises from the violation of anonymity attendant to
public exposure.7 The absence of any "publication" would preclude
actionability of the collection process. As to dissemination, even as-
suming that the governmental involvement would not make the data
"public" and constitutionally protect its "publication," it is not likely
that the data would be subject to the kind of public exposure upon
which an action must be predicated.72 Indeed, even if the publication
69. See, e.g., Nader v. General Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970); REsTATMENTr
(SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 652B.
Voluntarily disclosed personal information will be outside the scope of.this right.
Even if information is not voluntarily revealed, the particular means used to col-
lect personal information must be highly offensive. Surreptitious or secret collec-
tions of personal information without notice or consent may be considered
harmful by individuals, yet not rise to a sufficiently 'objectionable' level to meet
the threshold standard.
Reidenberg, supra note 31, at 223 (footnotes omitted). See generally, RICHARD C. TURKIraNroN,
GEORGE B. TRutow, ANInA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY, CASEs AND MATERtALs, Ch.2, E (1992).
70. Cf. IVHS ARcHrncruy, supra note 1, at 33 and 46, in which two of the architectural.
development teams suggest the absence of any privacy concerns because of acceptance by the
owner/driver of the identifying devices or because "[tihere is no mandatory participation re-
quired of any citizen with respect to his or her privacy."
71. REsTATEmENT (SECOND) oF TORrs § 652D cmt. a; see supra text accompanying notes
55-57.
72. See Reidenberg, supra note 31, at 223-24:
Personal information voluntarily disclosed or available from public sources does
not benefit from this [public disclosure tort] protection. As a result, activities such
as the preparation and dissemination of intimate personal profiles from disparate
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hurdle were overcome, it is questionable whether the "private facts"
involved are such as to support a privacy claim. It may well be that my
"inviolate personality" can be found in the accumulation of the ordi-
nary, banal facts of my life-my quotidian comings and goings-but
however useful such insight into my soul may be commercially, it is
not the stuff of which the classic privacy tort is made.73
Information, coherently presented, has value. With the ability to
gather and manipulate large amounts of data has come the "com-
modification" of information.74 To the extent that information peculiar
to me is used to further another's commercial purposes I am being
commercially exploited.7' However, the fact of exploitation-the ea-
ger market for screened or product-specific mailing lists is but the
most obvious example-does not necessarily lead to a claim against
the exploiter.
public sources of information or public revelations of information would not be
actionable. Recovery under this right further requires that there be a dissemination
of qualifying personal information to the general public. This, is interpreted to
mean general distribution to the public such as the circulation of a newspaper and
not just circulation of personal information among a closed group of people.
(footnotes omitted). See also Trubow, supra note 11, at 537:
'A relatively widespread publication of the information is required to constitute an
invasion of the privacy interest [and] the courts routinely accept such a limitation.
Because the "publication" of commercial data maintained in computer data bases
is routinely made to a small group, often one at a time, it may not satisfy this
requirement.
73. See Trubow, supra note 11:
Another pervasive problem in applying the private fact tort is the require-
ment that the information disclosed be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
The courts frequently deny the tort's application when the information, though
private and perhaps not of public interest, is not in itself deemed harmful or offen-
sive. Most of the information stored in commercial computer files is not offensive
or embarrassing, even though it does provide a detailed description of an individ-
ual's behavior, tastes, and values.
Id. at 537 (footnote omitted).
74. See, e.g., Agre, supra note 14, at 120:
Regardless of its particular content, captured information is distinguished by its
dual relationship-both product and representation-to the human activities upon
which particular grammars of action have been i'mposed. In particular, the capture
process makes "visible" a great deal of information-creating activity which had
formerly been left implicit in the production of other, historically prior commodi-
ties. Moreover, the phenomenon of capture extends market relations not simply
through the commodification of the captured information itself (if in fact that
information is marketed), but also through the movement toward market relations,
through a reduction in transaction costs, of the human activities that the informa-
tion represents. In other words, by imposing a mathematically precise form upon
previously unformalized activities, capture standardizes those activities and their
component elements and thereby prepares them (again, other things being equal)
for an eventual transition to market-based relationships.
75. See Miller, supra note 11.
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Certainly, there is a well-recognized cause of action for commer-
cial appropriation of name or likeness.76 It has been suggested that
the tort "appropriation of name or likeness" for a commercial pur-
pose could provide an appropriate remedy [for the commercial use
of computer generated information]. A compelling argument can be
made that a collection of personal information sold as a dossier or
profile violates the appropriation tort .... When this tort is alleged,
in most instances, the appropriation has been accomplished by as-
sociating the plaintiff's personality with an advertisement for the
sale of goods or services or to link him with a particular cause or
viewpoint. When dossiers and profiles maintained by credit bureaus
and other such agencies are sold, the subject's personality is cer-
tainly being used for a commercial purpose.
77
Even here, however, adequate privacy protection is illusory. The
"commercial appropriation" privacy claim need not involve offensive
or embarrassing material; it is concerned simply with the commercial
use of one's name or likeness. Nevertheless, as developed both legis-
latively and by the courts, since the interest remains the subjective
interest in anonymity,78 freedom from public exposure, it would be
difficult to use this vehicle to prevent the inclusion of an individual's
name on a commercially available mailing list. Although the necessity
for the element of widespread, public exposure has been questioned,79
to the extent that a claim is based upon violation of anonymity, injury
to feelings, as opposed to economic harm, the privacy construct would
appear to require public exposure.8"
76. RSrTATmdENT (ScozND) oF ToRrs § 652C (1977).
77. Trubow, supra note 11, at 538.
78. See infra, text accompanying notes 88-101 for discussion of the proprietary, as op-
posed to emotional interest in connection with commercial appropriation. Although Dean Prosser
appears to equate the privacy interest here with the clearly proprietary interest implicated by the
right of publicity (Prosser, supra note 46, at 406), there is a significant difference in the nature of
the respective interests when one is complaining of the subjective harm, the injury to feelings
that follows from an unwanted public association of one's name or likeness with a commercial
endeavor and the economic injury which follows from uncompensated exploitation of the eco-
nomic value of persona. See, e.g., Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 307 (N.Y. 1984).
As the Sixth Circuit observed, "the right of privacy and the right of publicity protect fundamen-
tally different interests and must be analyzed separately." Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable
Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983).
79. See Tnzbow, supra note 11, at 539; see also RESrATEmEmr (SEcoND) OF ToRTs
§ 652C, cmt. a.
80. There does not appear to be significant case support for the RSTATE ET OF TORTS
position. The RESTATEmENT, the product primarily of Dean Prosser's approach to privacy, does
not adequately deal with the personal and proprietary distinctions that can arise in the case of
appropriation of identity. On the other hand, the newly adopted RESTATEmeNT (Tinw) OF "an
LAw oF UrFAIm CoMPmurrMON § 46 (1993) (set out, as of this writing, in Tentative Draft No, 4,
approved by the membership in May, 1993) clearly separates the economic, proprietary tort from
privacy considerations.
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Moreover, a privacy claim, as opposed to a property-based
claim,"1 must be predicated on the use of an individual's "name or
likeness" (or similar statutory formula).8" Thus, even if one agrees that
with respect to the kinds of uses to which IVHS information on indi-
vidual activities may be put "the subject's personality is ... being
used for a commercial purpose,"8 3 that observation only begins the
privacy inquiry; it doesn't resolve it. Whether the use of information
as such, in the form of a data profile, is or should be actionable is a
matter, as discussed below,84 different from the applicability of the
traditional privacy tort to this activity. It seems clear that a "profile," a
data set per se, would not be a taking within the contemplation of the
privacy tort.8" The privacy formulation does not protect personality in
general but only when it is appropriated by the specific identifiers.
Further, it is arguable at least that this kind of "personality pro-
file," inherently pedestrian and unremarkable, does not amount to the
unequivocal identifier of the persona that could be equated with
"name or likeness." In this context, it is likely that many individuals
would share the same "profile". Indeed, that very sharing is what gives
a collection of such profiles (e.g., in a mailing list) its value: there is
identified a discrete group of people sharing a set of traits or behavior
of interest to some commercial enterprise; one individual's name,
standing alone, has no real value. Does attaching a name to the profile
change the calculus of rights? The name here is essentially incidental
to the data set and it is at least arguable that, apart from the other
impediments, the incidental character of the use would present a fur-
ther obstacle to a privacy claim. 6
81. See infra text accompanying notes 88-101.
82. See, HAL'ERN, supra note 55.
83. Trubow, supra note 11, at 538.
84. Infra text accompanying notes 102-116.
85. See, e.g., Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994).
The narrative of an individual's life, standing alone, lacks the value of a name or
likeness that the misappropriation tort protects. Unlike the goodwill associated
with one's name or likeness, the facts of an individual's life possess no intrinsic
value that will deteriorate with repeated use.
Id., at 438. But cf Trubow, supra note 11, who suggests that "it is the individual's persona that is
the subject of the use, and the appropriation tort ought to apply." Id. at 539.
86. See RwSTATmaENT (SacoN) oF ToRTs § 652C, cmt d (1977):
No one has the right to object merely because his name or his appearance is
brought before the public, since neither is in any way a private matter and both are
open to public observation. It is only when the publicity is given for the purpose
of appropriating to the defendant's benefit the commercial or other values associ-
ated with the name or likeness that the right of privacy is invaded.
See University of Notre Dame du Lac v. Twentieth Century Fox, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301, aff'd. 207
N.E.2d 508 (1965); see also Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994) ("The
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Finally, even if it were possible to fit the use of IVHS informa-
tion into the privacy "appropriation" claim, protection would be lim-
ited to commercial use and would not at all extend to the matters of
accumulation of data and access to it. 7 In short, the traditional right of
privacy tort has little, if any meaningful application to the privacy is-
sues presented by IVHS, or, indeed to the general privacy problems
arising from the compilation of personal information.
C. Proprietary Interests
Related to, but distinct from, the subjective, feelings-based pri-
vacy right, are the economic rights, in the nature of proprietary rights,
that an individual may have in matters concerning him or her self. The
"right of publicity" has grown and matured in the law as the means for
protecting the economic, associative value of persona from commer-
cial exploitation."8 The right of publicity as currently understood was
the product of the determination of the Second Circuit in Haelan Lab-
oratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.89 recognizing a cause of
action for damages and other relief for the unauthorized commercial
appropriation of an individual's persona based upon the economic
value of the persona and independent of a common-law or statutory
right of privacy. Haelan was the start of a judicial and legislative
movement delineating an economic right in one's persona distinct
from the right of privacy. The linkage of the economic interest in per-
sonality with the privacy interest in solitude, the right to be free from
public exposure, has been the source of much confusion.90 After forty
misappropriation tort does not protect one's name per se; rather, it protects the value associated
with that name").
87. See Reidenberg, supra note 31, at 225:
[lit is possible that [the appropriation] right could apply to ban certain uses, in-
cluding dissemination, of personal information for commercial purposes without
consent. However, privacy concerns associated with the collection of personal
information-notice and consent to data acquisition, unnecessary data compila-
tion, and accuracy of data-and the storage of personal information would be
outside the scope of this misappropriation right.
88. For a comprehensive examination of the right of publicity, its relation to the other
interests and a detailed examination of the state and federal, common-law and statutory treatment
of the subject, see generally McCART-Y, supra note 38; see also HIm.PERN, supra note 48, Part
Three-Publicity; Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the
Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAD. L. Rnv. 1199 (1986).
89. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
90. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, The Right of Publicity: A 'Haystack in a Hurricane,' 55
TEMP. L.Q. 977, 981-83 (1982); Tim Frazer, Appropriation of Personality-A New Tort?, 99
LAw Q. Rv. 281, 295-99 (1983); Andrew B. Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability Reconsid-
ered, 49 FoRDHAmi L. Rnv. 453, 464-65 (1981); David E. Shipley, Publicity Never Dies; It Just
Fades Away: The Right of Publicity and Federal Preemption, 66 CoRNm.L L. Pav. 673, 681-82
(1981).
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years of maturation, the independent economic right seems to be
firmly established.91 The new Third Restatement of the Law of Unfair
Competition clearly separates the economic, proprietary tort from pri-.
vacy considerations:
Appropriation of the Commercial Value of a Person's Identity:
The Right of Publicity
One who appropriates the commercial value of a person's
identity by using without consent the person's name, likeness, or
other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability
for [monetary and injunctive] relief.9 2
Here the right has fully emerged, free of its analogic ancestors,
free of the constraints of a privacy pigeonhole in the Restatement of
Torts. With a base in the law of unfair competition, the commercial,
economic, appropriation characteristics of the interest to which the
right of publicity relates are fully recognized.
Of course, as with the "appropriation" right of privacy, this right
has no application to the collection, compilation and storage of data; it
is limited to commercial appropriation of identity. As to the commer-
cial taking, the independent right of publicity is not limited to the pri-
vacy "name or likeness" formulation but should be applicable to the
taking of identity by whatever means serve to effectuate that taking.
In most cases the appropriation of identity is accomplished
through the use of a person's name or likeness.... In the absence
of a narrower statutory definition, unauthorized use of other indicia
of a person's identity can also infringe the right of publicity... if
they are so closely identified with the person that their use enables
the defendant to appropriate the commercial value of the person's
identity.93
Thus, if one could demonstrate that a personality profile is indeed
an unequivocal identifier of a given individual,9 4 then presumably the
91. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Pub-
licity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REv. 125, 133 (1993) ("Most courts accept the existence ofthe right
and concern themselves with polishing its contours"); McCA THY, supra note 38, at § 1.10[C].
There are, of course exceptions, the most prominent of which is the determination by the New
York Court of Appeals rejecting a common-law right of publicity independent of New York's
statutory right of privacy. Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, (N.Y.
1984).
92. RESTATeMNT (THmD) OF TmE LAW OF UNFAIR COmrrON § 46 (1993).
93. l, cmt. d. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th
Cir. 1983) ("If the celebrity's identity is commercially exploited, there has been an invasion of
his right whether or not his 'name or likeness' is used"); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460
(1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513 (1992); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Circ.
1992).
94. But see supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
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right of publicity would be implicated by the commercial taking of the
profile, and the issue of whether the use of name in that context is
merely "incidental" 95 would be moot.
However, there remain serious obstacles to application of the
right of publicity to the commercial use of personal data. The right of
publicity has been peculiarly celebrity based; it has been concerned
with commercial appropriation of the associative value of personal-
ity.9 6 In that sense it has focused on the fact common to the cases that
the association with a well known person has served to enhance the
economic value of a product. There is certainly scholarly dispute over
the necessity of celebrity as an element of the right of publicity
claim,97 and the Third Restatement of Unfair Competition suggests
that there is no such limitation.98 Nevertheless the cases-and the
right is essentially a common-law right-have been almost exclu-
sively concerned with appropriation of the associative value of a ce-
lebrity, one whose identity has commercial value by itself.99
In any event, again, as with the privacy-based "appropriation"
claim, even if the claim could be extended to the non-publication, pri-
vate transactional uses contemplated in IVHS, the scope of protection
afforded by a right of publicity claim would be far narrower than the
array of privacy concerns raised by IVHS.
95. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
96. "At its heart, the value of the right of publicity is associational." McFarland v. Miller,
14 F.3d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1994). "Its primary purpose is to protect public figures and to provide
them with a descendible and assignable right." Trubow, supra note 11, at 538.
97. See Frazer, supra note 90, at 308; Richard B. Hoffman, The Right of Publicity-Heir's
Right, Advertisers' Windfall, or Courts' Nightmare?, 31 DE PAUL L. Rev. 1,5 (1981); Andrew
B. Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability Reconsidered, 49 FoRDHAm L. Rev. 453, 473 (1981).
But, cf, Harold Gordon, Right of Property in Name, likeness, Personality and History, 55 NW.
U.L. REv. 553, 554-55 (1960); Roberta R. Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawningfor the Right of
Publicity?, 17 U.C.D. L. REv. 191, 202-03 (1983) (advocating recognition of a 'universal' right
of publicity); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CoTrmrp. PROBS. 203, 204
(1954); Harriet Pilpel, The Right of Publicity, 27 BULL. COPYIoHT Soc'Y 249, 255-56 (1980);
Shipley, supra note 90, at 723-24 n.325 (1981).
98. "[C]elebrities are not precluded from establishing cognizable injury to personal inter-
ests in addition to commercial loss, nor are less well-known plaintiffs precluded from establish-
ing commercial loss in addition to injury to personal interests." RESTATEmENT (TmRD) OF Tm
LAW OF UNFAM CoWOrrNow § 46 cmt. a. (1993).
99. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc., v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 296 S.E. 2d 697, 702 (Ga. 1982); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 438, n.2
(5th Cir. 1994) ('Ve grant celebrities a property right to ration the use of their names in order to
maximize their value over time"); McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[a]
famous individual's name, likeness, and endorsement carry value and an unauthorized use harms
the person both by diluting the value of the name and depriving that individual of compensa-
tion"); Ali v. Playgirl, 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("The distinctive aspect of the common
law right of publicity is that it recognizes the commercial value of the... representation of a
prominent person or performer, and protects his proprietary interest in the profitability of his
public... 'persona' "). See generally Halpern, supra note 88.
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In short, just as with the classic right to privacy complex, it is
difficult to find proprietary concepts that adequately address the pri-
vacy concerns raised by information technology. My life may be
"mine," but I don't necessarily have a property interest in its minu-
tia.'11 The facts of one's life, the things we do that may help to define
us, are not themselves within the ambit of protection to be found in the
right of publicity; nor are they the stuff of copyright or similar intel-
lectual property concepts.' 0 ' If the individual is to have- meaningful
control over the collection, compilation and use of observed personal
data, that control must come from a legal construct specifically created
for that purpose. That construct must peculiarly address the problem
of "informational privacy," divorced from the classic privacy or prop-
erty concepts underlying existing law.'0 2
IV. INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
There is a growing body of literature attempting to define and
expand upon the right to control and limit access to personal informa-
tion through a "legal right to informational privacy,"'0" and it is not
the purpose of this essay to redundantly survey the field. What has
emerged clearly is that "[i]n the United States... no single source of
privacy rights covers each data processing activity. Information pri-
vacy rights emerge from a complex web of federal and state laws that
have responded to narrowly identified problems .... ,,14
At the federal level, such privacy protection as exists is diffuse
and uncoordinated.'10 There is, most prominently, the federal statutory
informational privacy rights concerned primarily with access to and
100. Consider Who Owns a ibfe? Asks a Poet, When His Is Turned Into Fiction, N.Y.
Tuams, Feb. 20, 1994, Sec. 4, at 14, c. 1.
101. "[No author may copyright facts or ideas.' Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985). See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d
972 (2d Cir. 1980); Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990); Narell v. Freeman, 872
F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1989).
102. See Note, supra note 22, at 1413:
[Cbourts have usually rejected claims based on information privacy. The few re-
ported cases reflect the difficulty of making claims of violating information pri-
vacy. Plaintiffs and courts have attempted to squeeze these claims into the
existing framework of privacy law instead of recognizing that a new cause of
action is needed in the information age.
103. Turkington, supra note 39, at 487. See generally, Turkington, id.; Trubow, supra note
11; Reidenberg, supra note 31; Simitis, supra note 19; Note, supra note 22; see also TURK-
nGc-roN, Thuaow, AN AL.N, supra note 69, Ch. Two-Informational Privacy.
104. Reidenberg, supra note 31, at 201. For discussion of informational privacy legislation
in Europe, see id. at 200-201, and Simitis, supra note 19, passim.
105. See Trubow, supra note 11, at 530 ("no single federal agency is vested with the overall
responsibility of safeguarding informational privacy with respect to federal records [and] no
provision exists for the coordination of privacy policy throughout the federal establishment").
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use of governmentally collected dataY1 6 Thus, the Privacy Act of
1974107 is designed to prevent federal agencies from disclosing certain
personal information contained in agency records. Similarly, the Free-
dom of Information Act contains limitations on disclosure of agency
information when such disclosure would constitute a "clearly unwar-
ranted invasion of personal privacy." 108 There are also industry-spe-
cific laws, federal and state,"° that "provide a sphere of protection to
isolated concerns for narrowly-identified problems and are incomplete
responses to information privacy issues. This ad hoc ...approach
leaves many areas of information processing unaddressed . ..
While parts of this body of legislation might be useful in structuring
,the IVHS,IU they do not provide a coherent and consistent means of
balancing the personal privacy needs of the individual involved in the
system with the broad societal goals of safety, efficiency and conven-
ience to which IVHS is directed.
Adequate recognition of informational privacy in general, in the
various contexts in which the issue arises-crossing conceptual, tech-
nological and political boundaries-will not be found either in pro-
crustean manipulation of the common law of privacy or in an
incoherent complex of disparate special purpose legislation. If pri-
vacy considerations were the only criterion, then a comprehensive fed-
eral 2 legislative scheme directed to the collection, compilation,
106. For discussion and review of the various federal statutes see TUrINoGroN, TRUnOw,
AND Au., supra note 69, at 331-79.
107. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988).
108. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (Exemption 6). See United States Department of Defense v. Fed-
eral Labor Relations Authority, 114 S. Ct. 1006 (1994), in which the Court gave a broad reading
to the limitation, building on United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 765 (1989).
109. Reid~nberg, supra note 31, at 209-20, 229-34. As Reidenberg notes:
The scope of protection accorded by each of these industry-specific laws is gener-
ally limited. The full range of issues with respect to data processing activities for
personal information, such as fairness in the collection of data, data minimization,
data accuracy and permissible use of personal information, are not consistently
treated at the federal level.
Id at 210.
110. Id. at 209-10.
111. E.g., The Cable Communications Policy Act creates an array of rights for cable sub-
scribers and limitations on how a cable system may collect and store subscriber information and
What it may do with that information. 47 U.S.C. § 551(a)(1) (1988).
112. The trans-boundary nature of much of the technology that feeds personal information
databases would probably be sufficient itself to provide the foundation for comprehensive federal
preemptive intervention.
Because personal information flows are not confined to state or national borders,
it may be most appropriate to adopt any new rights at the federal level. Differ-
ences in privacy protection among the states could readily have adverse or dis-
torting effects on interstate commerce and international data flows. Business has
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storage, access to and dissemination of personal information would be
the optimal means of providing a coherent and effective informational
privacy blanket around information technology. While there is un-
doubted appeal in such comprehensive coverage, there is also serious
question about the desirability of such a blanket.
Generalization about informational privacy is dangerous.
"[S]ocial discourse depends on an information allocation policy that,
through a mix of withholding and access, reflects a precise analysis
and understanding of the consequences of automated processing-for
both the individual and society."' Information, as such, compiled
and correlated collections of data, is neither good nor evil; the technol-
ogy, developed and developing, for the collection and manipulation of
data offers the potential for social good and the opportunity for op-
pressive abuse' 4 and any policy relating to the limitation of access
and use of technologically generated information must in a sophisti-
cated manner consider all of the interests and preserve as much of the
good as is consistent with societal health.
[Tihe boundary between a permissible exchange of facts about peo-
ple, necessary to avoid misrepresentation, and an impermissible in-
trusion and surveillance is entirely unclear. . . . The answer
depends essentially on the particular purposes of each data col-
lection as well. as on the mode of the information process and
the potential implications of the data use for the persons under
scrutiny.' 5
While we speak of "informational privacy" in general terms, the
issue arises in highly specific situations in which there is a continual
need to balance the individual privacy needs and the overall societal
information needs. Limitation and restriction in one area (e.g., mainte-
nance of individual credit card purchase information for targeted mail-
ing lists) may be singularly inappropriate in another (e.g., general
credit history for credit granting ptirposes); similarly, the kinds of lim-
historically supported uniformity of any mandatory rules to avoid the confusion of
fifty separate sets of state privacy regulations.
Reidenberg, supra note 31, at 238-39 (footnotes on-fitted).
113. Simitis, supra note 19, at,735 (footnote omitted).
114. "[T]he processing of personal information.., in a great number of dituations in the
public as well as the private sector serves both the user and the individual under scrutiny." Id. 4t
739.
115. Id. at 709 (footnote omitted).
The increased access to personal information resulting from modem, sophis-
ticated techniques of automated processing has sharpened the need to abandon the
search for a 'neutral' concept in favor of ai understanding free of abstractions and
fully aware of the political and societal background of all privacy debates.
Id.
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itations considered essential on governmental agency activity may
well be unnecessarily restrictive when applied to a specific private
industry. In short, it may be necessary to continue to deal with specific
information privacy issues in a piecemeal fashion. A comprehensive
informational privacy legislative blanket suffers from the debility
either of being too general, too thin to be of any real value, or of being
too specific and inflexible to foster rather than stifle necessary and
productive information technology.' 1 6
V. PRIVACY AND IVHS: A MINIMALIST TECHNOLOGICAL
ACCOMMODATION
Technical resources.. must be mobilized. Instead of a simple
focus on the convenience of the potential user, the safeguarding of
privacy must become an equally powerful consideration in all fur-
ther development of information technology. Hardware and
software should, like motor vehicles or medicine, meet certain
safety requirements before being put on the market. They should
have a minimum of built-in protective devices. This requirement is
by no means a utopian expectation. 1 7
If we deal specifically with the privacy issues raised by IVHS,
rather than seek a broad informational privacy legal paradigm, a work-
able accommodation of the conflicting interests may be feasible. By
looking at the purposes of lVHS, the specific uses to which the tech-
nology is to be put-rather than the uses which may arise from the
existence of the technology once in place-the systems may be
designed both to facilitate accomplishing their purposes and to
minimize interference with personal privacy. The technology itself,
through the system architecture, can be the vehicle for
accommodation.
Thus, while concern over the "dossier" and its use can be some-
what alleviated by means of carefully crafted restrictions on access
and on dissemination and commercial use,"' in the context of IVHS a
116. Cf. Reidenberg, supra note 31, at 238-43.
While the public interest suggests that an articulated set of legal rights re-
spond systematically to the plethora of privacy concerns, a purely general ap-
proach is likely to lead to difficulties balancing individual and commercial
interests. Some means to accommodate both varying contexts for the processing
of personal information and varying levels of concern may be necessary.
Id. at 240. Reidenberg discusses the European experience (Id. at 237-41) and notes that "[t]he
trend in more recent European national legislation also recognizes the complexity of the informa-
tion economy and the need for greater flexibility." Id. at 241.
117. Simitis, supra note 19, at 739.
118. In short, a scheme of tailored regulation that inevitably would entail the need to build
in exceptions and invite the search for exploitable lacunae.
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more promising avenue is in the collection/storage process itself.
None of the IVHS goals require more than transitory retention of per-
sonal data. While a given system is operating-its -real time function-
ing-it may-be necessary specifically to identify a tagged vehicle, but
the purpose of the system is not furthered by retention of the identify-
ing tags themselves. Advanced Vehicle Control systems, directed to
individual, specific vehicles, need to identify the vehicle, but only so
long as the system is operating on that vehicle; similarly, the Auto-
matic Vehicle Identification, Automatic Vehicle Location, Advanced
Traveler Information Systems, and other systems designed to assist or
provide information to individually identified vehicles need the identi-
fication only for the immediate action taken. Even for the mundane
matter of toll collection, the use of "smart cards" does not require user
identification or the maintenance of individual accounts if users sim-
ply use pre-purchased, "bearer" cards which exhaust their value as
they are used at collection or tracking stations.119
Retention of individually identified behavioral data or other vehi-
cle specific information as such then is extraneous to the system's
ends, however ultimately useful for other purposes or exploitable it
may be. The IVHS mandate' 20 is transportation-specific. The purpose
of IVHS is "to help.., in meeting the goals of ISTEA,"''1 1 the In-
termodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991.122 ["T]he
emphasis [of IVHS is] on enhancing the existing transportation sys-
tem."'" Deployment of IVHS is seen as "leading to safety improve-
ments, amelioration of congestion, reduced environmental impact,
more efficient energy use, and enhanced national productivity."'' In-
formation data banks per se are not part of this vision.
If technological restriction is placed on retention of individually
identifiable data, issues of profile creation or commercial exploitation
of name and history become academic; IVHS is lifted bodily outside
the informational privacy debate. While one may view built in techno-
logical restriction as a ways of limiting the potential of the technology,
the aim of IVHS is not technology for its own sake but its application
to specific transportation needs. Rather than disabling, restricting col-
lection is a form of technological parsimony-using technical skill
and resources to meet specific important societal needs. "Some ...
119. "Smart cards and videotex can, at least for payment purposes, be designed in a way
that demands almost no collection of personal data." Simitis, supra note 19, at 740.
120. 23 U.S.C. § 307 nt.
121. STxRaoGic PLAN, supra note 5, at 1-2.
122. 49 U.S.C. § 101 nt.
123. Williams, supra note 4, at 683.
124. S&xRaic PLANe, supra note 5, at Il-.
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privacy concerns may be resolved through the use of technology .....
Information networks may be structured to provide only the minimal
amount of personal information necessary to accomplish a particular
task and to delete personal information as soon as it is no longer
needed." 1
In short, what is suggested is that the informational privacy
problems be addressed at the level of system architecture.12 6 Consis-
tent with the purposes underlying IVHS, the component systems can
be designed to avoid the collection of personally identifiable data ex-
cept where necessary to system functioning and, in those instances, to
provide for the purging of tags and other individually referable refer-
ences once the immediate need for the identification has passed. In
view of the deep federal involvement, the federal legislative founda-
tion for the development of the systems, and the obvious nationwide
scope of the undertaking, federal legislation with respect to this aspect
of system architecture would be perfectly appropriate. In an applica-
tion of Occam's Razor, the technology out of which the problem
arises becomes the vehicle for its solution.
VI. CONCLUSION
The "classic" privacy tort, both in its teleology and in the way it
is currently applied, has little significant application to the issues of
observation, data collection, storage, access, dissemination and use
which make up the IVHS privacy complex. Similarly, the proprietary
interests which underlie the rights of publicity and intellectual prop-
erty, are not directed to the data and uses that impact upon individual
privacy through this technology. The issues here, essentially those of
"informational privacy," cannot be dealt with by the existing common
law without serious distortion of both the law and the interests to be
protected. Nor do existing informational privacy statutes provide ap-
propriate protection that is consistent with the aims to be achieved by
IVHS. Technological variety and the multi-faceted character of data
collection and manipulation in diverse contexts would appear to pre-
clude seeking comprehensive federal legislation to deal with informa-
tional privacy and technology in general, that would, inter alia,
125. Reidenberg, supra note 31, at 239-40.
126. A cognate issue arose in connection with copyright protection for musical recordings
following the development of consumer directed digital audio tape equipment. Such equipment
can be used to make digital recordings of audio compact disks ostensibly indistinguishable in
quality from the original. Driven by fear of widespread infringement, musical copyright owners
sought to prevent importation of these devices. Ultimately, the problem was resolved for all
practical purposes by legislation requiring such equipment to be so constructed as to prevent
making of serial digital copies (i.e. copies of copies) of a digital original. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001.
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embrace the IVHS privacy concerns. Rather, what is appropriate in the
context of the Intelligent Vehicle Highway Systems-where little pur-
pose is served by the retention of personal data-is limited, tightly
tailored restrictions on the technology itself, sharply constricting the
ability of the systems to retain personal data. Ultimately, even if only
through general guidelines, the overall problem of informational pri-
vacy in a high technology, information oriented society, will have to
be faced. The IVHS presents neither the appropriate problem nor is it
the appropriate vehicle for such an endeavor.
Q
